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Abstract 
Science studies has been often against the normative dimension of 
epistemology, which made a naturalistic study of science impossible. But this is not 
to say that a new type of normativity cannot be detected at work in science studies. 
This is especially true in the second wave of studies dealing with the body which 
has been aiming at criticizing the physicalisation of the body without falling 
nonetheless in the various traps of a phenomenology simply added to a physical 
substrate. This paper explores the work of Isabelle Stengers and Vinciane Despret 
in that respect and show how it can be used to rethink the articulation between the 
various levels that make up a body. 
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During the conference that provided the occasion for this issue, I did a little 
test and asked everyone to write down what the antonym of the word ‘body’ was. 
In the long list I got, apart from predictable and amusing definitions like 
‘antibody’ or ‘nobody’ the most arresting for me were: “unaffected” and “death”. 
If the opposite of being a body is dead, there is no life to expect apart from the 
body, especially not an after-life, nor a life of a mind: either you have, you are a 
body, or you are dead, you have become a corpse, you enter into some sort of 
macabre body count. This is a direct consequence of Vinciane Despret’s argument 
drawing on William James on emotion (in this issue): to have a body is to learn to be 
affected, meaning ‘effectuated’, moved, put into motion by other entities, humans 
or nonhumans. If you are not engaged in this learning you become insensitive, 
dumb, you drop dead.  
Equipped with such a ‘patho-logical’ definition of the body, one is not obliged 
to define an essence, a substance (what the body is by nature), but rather, I will 
argue, an interface that becomes more and more describable as it learns to be affected by many 
more elements. The body is thus not a provisional residence of something superior —
an immortal soul, the universal, or thought— but what leaves a dynamic 
trajectory by which we learn to register and become sensitive to what the world is 
made of. Such is the great virtue of this definition: there is no sense in defining the 
body directly, but only in rendering the body sensitive to what these other 
elements are. By focusing on the body, one is immediately —or rather, 
mediately— directed to what the body has become aware of. This is my way of 
interpreting James’ sentence: “Our body itself is the palmary instance of the 
ambiguous” (James, 1996 [1907]).  
Since discussion of this topic is notoriously difficult, I want to try to approach 
it by theorizing not the body directly but rather ‘body talk’, that is, the many ways 
in which the body is engaged in accounts about what it does. Under what 
condition can we mobilize the body in our speech in such a way that we are not 
immediately led to the usual discussions about dualism and holism? I will do this 
in two successive ways. First, I want to show the immense difference it makes in 
body talks if one uses propositions (which are articulate or inarticulate) instead of 
statements (that are true or false). This will allow me to give back to the body all 
the material impedimenta that make it sensitive to differences. Then, and more 
extensively, I will present a different normative definition of what it is to speak 
scientifically about the body. This ‘political epistemology’ drawn from the work of 
Isabelle Stengers and Vinciane Despret will allow me to reach a conclusion as to 
the conditions under which we can maintain some ‘freedom of speech’ in body 
talk: an essential right, I will argue, in the coming time of what has been called 
bio-power. 
Articulations and propositions 
We first have to understand what ‘learning to be affected’ could mean. I will 
start with a very simple example, the training of ‘noses’ for the perfume industry 
through the use of ‘Malettes à odeurs’ [odor kits] as described by Geneviève Teil 
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(Teil, 1998 ). The advantage of this example is that it is much less dramatic than 
the medicine cases often automatically associated with discussions about the body 
(see Hirshauer, 1991) while remaining closely associated with the question of 
aesthetics and skills (see Gomart, this issue), and retaining a close contact with 
hard core chemistry.  
The odor kit is made of series of sharply distinct pure fragrances arranged in 
such a way that one can go from sharpest to smallest contrasts. To register those 
contrasts one needs to be trained through a week-long session. Starting with a 
dumb nose unable to differentiate much more than ‘sweet’ and ‘fetid’ odors, one 
ends up rather quickly becoming a ‘nose’ [un nez] that is, someone able to 
discriminate more and more subtle differences and being able to tell them apart 
from one another, even when they are masked by or mixed with others. It is not 
by accident that the person is called ‘a nose’ as if, through practice, she had 
acquired an organ that defined her ability to detect chemical and other differences. 
Through the training session, she learned to have a nose which allowed her to 
inhabit a (richly differentiated odoriferous) world. Thus body parts are 
progressively acquired at the same time that ‘world counter-parts’ are being 
registered in a new way. Acquiring a body is thus a progressive enterprise that 
produces at once a sensory medium and a sensitive world. 
The key element that I want to underline in this brief description is the kit 
itself, the ‘Mallette à odeurs’ which plays in the hands of this specialist the role of 
the de facto standard. Although it is not a part of the body as traditionally defined, 
it certainly is a part of the body understood as ‘training to be affected’. As far as 
progressive sensation is concerned, the kit is coextensive to the body. The 
specialist has bottled up contrasts in a systematic way. Through his kit and his 
ability as a teacher, he has been able to render his indifferent pupils attentive to 
ever subtler differences in the inner structure of the pure chemical he has 
managed to assemble. He has not simply moved the trainees from inattention to 
attention, from semi-conscious to conscious appraisal. He has taught them to be 
affected, that is effected by the influence of the chemicals which, before the session, 
bombarded their nostrils to no avail —effect and affect come from facere and are 
other cases of what I have called factishes —that is, what includes an active act of 
construction in ‘facts’ as well as in ‘fetishes’, hence the neologism (Latour, 1996). 
Before the session, odours rained on them without making them act, without 
making them speak, without rendering them attentive, without arousing them in 
precise ways: any group of odours would have produced  the same general 
undifferentiated effect or affect on the pupil. After the session, it is not in vain that 
odours are different, and every atomic interpolation generates differences in the 
pupil who is slowly becoming a ‘nose’, that is someone for which odours in the 
world are not producing contrasts without in some ways affecting her. The 
teacher, the kit and the session is what allows differences in the odours to make the 
trainees do something different every time —instead of eliciting always the same 
crude behaviour. The kit (with all its associated elements) is part and parcel of 
what it is to have a body, that is to benefit from a richer odoriferous world. 
It is crucial to find an accurate way to describe this ‘learning to be affected’, 
because I want to contrast it with another model that may become parasitic on my 
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description.. In that model, there is a body, meaning a subject; there is a world, 
meaning objects; and there is an intermediary, meaning a language, that 
establishes connections between the world and the subject. If we use this model, 
we will find it very difficult to render the learning by the body dynamic: the 
subject is ‘in there’ as a definite essence, and learning is not essential to its 
becoming; the world is out there, and affecting others is not essential to its essence. 
As to the intermediaries —language, odour kits— they disappear once the 
connection has been established since they do nothing but conveying a linkage. 
More worrisome will be the qualification of the connection itself: if we use the 
subject-object model we will be tempted to ask the question of how accurate is the 
perception by the nose of the odours registered in the kit. We will soon be obliged 
to recognize that huge differences in the kit are not registered by every nose and 
that, conversely, some are sensitive to contrasts that have no correspondence into 
the chemical structure of the purified fragrances. In trying to solve this question of 
discrepancies among the various accounts, we will thus be tempted to split odours 
in two: first, odours as they reside in the world —registered by chromatographs 
and chemical analysis and synthesis (more on this below)— and, second,  odours 
as they are sniffed by an unreliable, wavering and limited human apparatus. We 
will end up with a world made up of a substrate of primary qualities —what science 
sees but that the average human misses—, on top of which subjects have simply 
added mere secondary qualities that exist only in our mind, imagination and cultural 
accounts. In the course of this operation, the interesting body will have disappeared: 
either the body will be the nature in us, the physiological body, that is, the 
chemistry of the nose receptors connecting directly with the tertiary structures of 
the pheromones and other aerosols, or it will be subjective embodiment, the 
phenomenological body that will thrive on the lived-in impression provided by 
something ‘more’ than effects of chemistry on our nose. No matter how alive we 
make this supplement of attention, it will always refer only to the depth of our 
subjection to ourselves, no longer to what the world is really like. This is what 
Whitehead has called the ‘bifurcation of nature’ (Whitehead, 1920). Either we 
have the world, the science, the things, and no subject, or we have the subject and 
not the world, what things really are. The stage is prepared for lengthily discussion 
about ‘the’ mind-body problem —and endless series of holistic arguments to 
‘reconcile’ the physiological and the phenomenological bodies in one single whole. 
Now that we are aware of the alternative description and thus of the trap into 
which it is so easy to fall, let us try to steer our account away from this entropic 
trough and maintain it as far as possible from equilibrium… ‘Overcoming the 
mind-body dualism’ is not an aboriginal Big Question: it is simply the effect of not 
holding to a dynamic definition of the body as ‘learning to be affected’. This is 
especially salient when we compare what happens to a pupil learning to become a 
‘nose’, with what happens to her teacher devising his odour kit through a long 
enquiry among 2.000 untutored ‘noses’, and with what happens to the chemists 
when they try to build instruments and apparatus to register chemical differences 
in the various disciplines surrounding the industrial branch of perfume 
manufacturing. Each of these different actors can be defined as bodies learning to be 
affected by hitherto unregistrable differences through the mediation of an artificially made set up. 
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The sentence is clumsy, but we should remember that it is perilously easy to fall 
into the alternative provided by the tradition of ‘body talks’. Clarity here would be 
misleading. The pupil needs the one week session and the kit; the professor 
benefits from his life long expertise and the 2.000 person test; the organic chemists 
are equipped with their chromatographs; the industrial chemical engineers possess 
their plants. All those artificial set ups are simultaneously layered to make my nose 
sensitive to differences, namely, to be moved into action by the contrast between 
two entities.  
With this other account, I do not have to distinguish between primary and 
secondary qualities: if I, an untutored nose, need the odour kit to become sensitive 
to contrast, chemists need their analytical instruments to render themselves 
sensitive to differences of one single displaced atom. They too acquire a body, a 
nose, an organ, through their laboratories this time, and also thanks to their 
conferences, their literature, and all the paraphernalia that make up what could be 
called the collective body of science (Knorr-Cetina, 1999). We, the laymen, might not 
register the same differences. There may exist many discrepancies among 
untutored noses, but that is not to say that we should draw one big cut between my 
subjectivity and their objectivity, because organic chemists too will slightly and 
productively disagree among themselves. As to process engineers in charge of 
perfume manufacturing, they too will elicit many contrasts among them, and also 
between chemists and organist chemists, against ‘noses’, and between ‘noses’ and 
consumer panels, etc.  
The lesson to be drawn from this little example, is that bodies are our 
common destiny because there is no meaning in saying that without my body I 
could smell better, that without the kit I could become a better nose, that without 
a laboratory analytical chemists could do better chemistry, or that without plants 
better fragrances could be industrially produced… A direct and unmediated 
access to the primary qualities of odours could only be detected by a bodiless nose. 
But the opposite of embodied is dead, not omniscient.  
One way I have found to talk about those layers of differences is to use the 
word articulation. Before the week long session, the pupils were inarticulate. Not 
only in the sense of a conscious and literary sophistication, of their ability to speak 
about the odours; but they were also inarticulate in a deeper and more important 
sense: different odours elicited the same behaviour. Whatever happened to the world, only 
the same obstinately boring subject manifested itself. An inarticulate subject is 
someone who whatever the other says or acts always feels, acts and says the same 
thing (for instance, repeating ego cogito to every thing that affects the subject is a 
clear proof of inarticulate dumbness!). In contrast, an articulate subject is someone 
that learns to be affected by the others —not by itself. There is nothing especially 
interesting, deep, profound, worthwhile in a subject ‘by itself’, this is the limit of 
the common definition —a subject only becomes interesting, deep, profound, 
worthwhile when it resonates with others, is effected, moved, put into motion by 
new entities whose differences are registered in new and unexpected ways. 
Articulation thus does not mean ability to talk with authority —we will see in the 
next section that authoritative talks may be employed to repeat always the same 
thing— but being affected by differences. 
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The main advantage of the word articulation is not its somewhat ambiguous 
connection with language and sophistication, but its ability to take on board the 
artificial and material components allowing one to progressively have a body. It is not 
inappropriate to say that the odour kit ‘articulates’  pupils’ perceptions with 
fragrances produced by the industry and demonstrations given by the professor. If 
differences is what generates meaning, to have pure odours bottled up into little 
flasks and opened on schedule, beginning with starkest contrast so as to end up, 
after many repeats, with smaller ones, is a way to give a voice, that is a meaning, 
to whatever conditions generates odor tasting. The local, material, and artificial 
setting cannot be construed as a mere intermediary, especially not as the arbitrary 
symbolization by a subject of an ‘indifferent’ world, but as what allows, because of 
the artificiality of the instrument, the differences of the world to be loaded into what 
appeared at first arbitrary sets of contrasts. Once we have gone through the 
training session, the word ‘violet’ carries at last the fragrance of the violet and all 
of its chemical undertones. Through the materiality of the language tools, words 
finally carry worlds. What we say, feel and act, is geared on differences registered 
in the world. Resemblance is not the only way to load words into world —the 
proof being that the word violet does not smell like violet no more than the word 
‘dog’ barks—, but that does not mean that words float arbitrarily over an 
unspeakable world of objects. Language has immensely more resources for being 
rooted in reality than mimesis. Contrary to Wittgenstein’s famous saying (that day, 
he should have remained silent!), what cannot be said can be articulated.  
The decisive advantage of articulation over accuracy of reference is that there 
is no end to articulation whereas there is an end to accuracy. Once the 
correspondence between the statement and the state of affair, has been validated, 
it is the end of the story —except if a gnawing doubt about faithfulness is 
introduced to corrupt the quality of the correspondence. There is no such a 
trauma with articulation because it does not expect accounts to converge into one 
single version that will close the discussion with a statement that would be nothing 
but a mere replication of the original. There is no gnawing doubt about the 
faithfulness of the articulation either (although there is a deep moral scruples, as 
we shall see, to distinguish inarticulate from articulate states of affair). In a 
beautiful case of paradoxical madness, those who imagine statements simply 
corresponding to the world pursue an aim that is utterly self-contradictory: they 
want to be silent and tautological, that is, exactly repeat the original in the model, 
which is of course impossible, hence the constant effort and the constant failure, 
and the constant unhappiness of epistemologists.  
Articulations, on the other hand, may easily proliferate without stopping 
registering differences. On the contrary, the more contrast you add, the more 
differences and mediations you become sensible to. Controversies among scientists destroy 
statements that tries hopelessly to mimic matters of fact, but they feed 
articulations, and feed them well. If you add to the training session that revealed 
so many discrepancies among noses, all the controversies among physiologists 
about the olfactory and gustatory receptors, the discussion will not stop, nor will 
they become aimless, as if judgment of taste had lost their direction by losing their 
bedrock of primary qualities: they will simply have become more interesting. This 
 77- Body talk    Body and society          7 
will be all the more so, if you now add to the session the cultural history of odour 
detection in the way that Corbin has pioneered (Corbin, 1998), or if you add the 
weight of commercial and industrial strategies trying to corner markets through 
perfume differentiation. The more mediations the better to acquire a body, that is, 
to become sensitive to the effects on more different entities (see the ‘materiology’ 
of the French philosopher François Dagognet (especially Dagognet, 1989)). The 
more you articulate controversies, the wider the world becomes.  
This is a result totally unanticipated by the traditional picture of subjects 
registering the world through accurate statements about it and converging on one 
world. “Ah”, sighs the traditional subject, “if only I could extract myself from this 
narrow minded body and roam through the cosmos, unfettered by any 
instrument, I would see the world as it is, without words, without models, without 
controversies, silent and contemplative”; “Really?” replies the articulated body 
with some benign surprise, “why do you wish to be dead? For myself, I want to be 
alive and thus I want more words, more controversies, more artificial settings, 
more instruments, so as to become sensitive to even more differences. My 
kingdom for a more embodied body!” 
The real impact of the notion of articulation is not felt, however, as long as 
one does not say what is articulated. It cannot be ‘words’, as if articulation was a 
purely logocentric term. The odour kit is not made of words, nor is the professor, 
nor is the institution that allows trainees to be educated in having a nose, nor is the 
chromatograph nor the professional bodies of organic and synthetic chemistry. It 
cannot be ‘things’ if by this we mean a substance defined by primary qualities, for 
instance the tertiary structure of perfumes or the DNA code for manufacturing 
olfactory receptors, because then the bodies that are affected by those differences 
will have entirely disappeared and, with them, the articulation. Working in the 
vicinity of Isabelle Stengers’ Whitehead, I have acquired the habit of using the 
word propositions to describe what is articulated. The word ‘proposition’ conjugates 
three crucial elements: a) it denotes obstinacy (position), that b) have no definitive 
authority (it is a pro-position only) and c) it may accept to negotiate itself into a com-
position without losing its solidity.  
These three features are entirely missing in the idea of ‘statements 
referring to matters of fact through the fragile bridge of correspondence’. 
Matters of facts are obstinate, not negotiable. As to the statements, the best 
they can do is to disappear into tautology, the copy being nothing more than 
the model. The worst defect of the notion of statements however, is their 
constitutive unhappiness: when they interpret matters of facts, statements say 
nothing as long as they do not say the thing itself. This they can not of course, 
thus they are always missing their targets, feeling insecure and empty, and, as 
a consequence, they never provide good instruments to load the world into 
words and only leave in their wake angry and frustrated epistemologists. With 
statements one can never compose a world at once solid, interpreted, 
controversial and meaningful. With articulated propositions, this progressive 
composition of a common world (see below) becomes at least thinkable 
(Latour, 2004).  
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To say that odours are propositions articulated in part by the training session, 
the odour kit and all the other institutions, is not to say that they are ‘things’ —
primary qualities— named in ‘words’ by the (arbitrary or socially constrained) 
labelling activity of a human subject. This is the key philosophical difference the 
reader might have to provisionally accept if we want to theorize the body in a new 
way The articulation of the perfumes do something to the odours themselves, which is 
at once obvious if one takes into account the enormous mass of transformations 
they undergo in the hands of the chemical industry and fashion cultures, and hard 
to swallow since we risk losing the obstinate obduracy of chemicals which are ‘out 
there’ whatever we, humans, do to them. Let us be careful here, and maintain our 
account away from the attraction of ‘good sense’ (so different from common 
sense). The ugly head of social constructivism —that is, idealism— appears only 
when the traditional description of statements and matters of facts is being staged: 
if a statement errs it has no reference; if it refers accurately, it could as well not 
exist at all since it is purely redundant. Only about statements do we raise the 
question « is it real or constructed?», a question that seems not only profound but 
also morally and politically crucial to maintain a liveable social order. For 
articulated propositions, such a query is totally irrelevant and slightly quaint since 
the more artificiality, the more sensorium, the more bodies, the more affections, the 
more realities will be registered (Latour, 2002). Reality and artificiality are 
synonyms, not antonyms. Learning to be affected means exactly that: the more 
you learn, the more differences there exist. 
This is not the place to develop those metaphysical points (but see (Latour, 
1999) and (Stengers, 1996)). At this point, we only need an image or a metaphor 
to focus on the body problem. To say that the world is made of articulated 
propositions is to imagine first parallel lines, the propositions, flowing into the same 
direction in a laminar flow and then, because of some clinamen, generating 
intersections, bifurcations, splitting, that produce many eddies transforming the 
laminar flow into a turbulent one. The only advantage of this rudimentary 
metaphor is to help us contrast with the other venerable metaphor of a face to face 
meeting between a subjective mind speaking in words about a world out there. 
This metaphor, no less crude than mine, has the enormous disadvantage of 
forcing us to imagine no other relation but that of a zero-sum game between 
representations in the mind and reality in the world.: In this tug-of-war, whatever 
the mind adds to its representations, it is lost for the world that becomes simply 
mis-represented; whenever the world is accurately represented, the mind and its 
subjectivity are made redundant.  
Among articulated propositions, on the other hand, there is no such a zero-
sum game. Everyone of the participants may gain by becoming more sensitive to 
differences. To name such a world, I will employ the term multiverse put to such 
good use by James: the multiverse designates the universe freed from its premature 
unification. It is exactly as real as the universe, except the latter can only register the 
primary qualities while the former registers all of the articulations. The universe is 
made of essences, the multiverse, to use a Deleuzian or a Tardian expression 
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(Tarde, 1999 re-edition)1, is made of habits. This does not mean, as we shall see in 
the last section, that we abandon unity since we do not go from one universe to 
multiple worlds —we still talk about the multiverse—, but that we do not want a 
unification which would have been done on the cheap and without due process. 
To become well ‘versed’ into the world, to make it turn —vertere— all at once, we 
suspect, requires a lot more work than the utterly implausible imposition of 
primary qualities. 
Now that we have displaced the problem of having a body into ‘accounting 
for a multiverse of articulated propositions’ (to use my jargon), we have to devote 
some attention to a difficulty that could ruin all our efforts at redescription and let 
the body tumble down into the trough of ordinary ‘body talks’, broken into 
physiology and phenomenology. It might all be very well to speak of propositions 
instead of statements, but what is the difference between badly and well articulated 
propositions? As long as we do not answer this question, the definition of a body as 
‘learning to be affected’ will appear as one more plea for multiplicity, another 
postmodern attempt at breaking the ordinary way of talking about nature and 
society, body and soul.  
At this point, we have to acknowledge that the traditional description of 
statements, matter of facts and correspondence, was able to tackle this normative 
question fairly well: if a statement does not correspond to a state of affairs, it’s 
false, if it does, it’s true. If the cat is on the mat, the statement ‘the cat is on the 
mat’ is verified. No matter how implausible and unworkable such a description of 
the act of reference is, it will always be preferred to articulated propositions simply 
because it appears, on the face of it, to deal with the difference between true and 
false —not to say good and bad— that the other new and more realistic 
description fails to do. It is with this objection that I want to take issue in the next 
section, by doing a bit of what I could call political epistemology. Once this excursus 
will have been completed, I will be able in the conclusion to propose another 
solution to theorizing the body.  
The Stengers-Despret falsification 
principle 
If the world is made of propositions, and if the action of knowledge is 
conceived as articulation, we are not left without any normative stance. On the 
contrary, it might be possible to recast a falsification principle that would be more 
fine-tuned, more discriminatory and more sharp-edged than the one devised by 
Karl Popper. From the writings of Isabelle Stengers and her colleague Vinciane 
Despret, a coherent picture for an alternative normative political epistemology 
emerges which can be summarized as follows2. 
                                                
1 Gabriel Tarde was older than Durkheim and defined an alternative sociology which has barely 
survived (see Tarde, edited by Clark, 1969), but is now revived because it does connect much 
closer with biology than his more traditional counterpart. (For an introduction, see Latour, 2002).    
2 Isabelle Stengers (Stengers 1996; 1997; 1998), trained as a chemist, has become one of the most 
important philosophers of science in the French speaking world. Currently a professor in Brussels, 
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1. The scientific is a rare ingredient of science 
First, ‘knowing’ is not the automatic outcome of an all-purpose general 
methodology: it is, to the contrary, a rare event. Although it is crucially important 
to distinguish bad from good science, what is scientific from what is not, there is 
no way to make this distinction once and for all, and especially no way to dictate 
in advance for all fields of inquiries if they have a vocation for being scientific or if 
they will always fail, whatever they do. Through the seven (small) volumes of her 
Cosmopolitics, Stengers insists that the rare success of a given science is not easily 
transportable to any other instance. This is especially true when moving from the 
natural sciences to the social or human ones (more on this below). Knowing 
interestingly is always a risky business which has to be started from scratch for any new 
proposition at hand. This first feature is already at odds with most normative urges in 
philosophy of science. Although many epistemologists would agree that the dream 
of a general scientific methodology is a fallacy, they would nonetheless wish for 
principles general enough to guarantee that some domains of enquiry are more 
scientific than others in toto. Popper’s project was devised, for instance, to make 
sure that a sharp demarcation be made between science and non-sense, and to 
distinguish among the sciences the good apples from the rotten ones. The 
Stengers-Despret’s shibboleth aims at cutting into not only the sciences the 
sciences (even the hardest ones) but also to accept as well articulated interesting 
endeavours that the other cuts would have placed widely outside of science 
altogether. There is nothing to be surprised about in those disputes: by definition, 
political epistemologies are made to disagree on those limits, including about the 
demarcation between science and politics (Latour, 1999). 
 
2. Scientific means interesting  
Second, to be scientific, in the new definition given by S-D, knowledge has to 
be interesting. As it has been noted by so many studies of scientists at work, to the 
qualifications of “It is scientific?”, scientists often add the query: “May be so, but is 
it interesting?”. Fecundity, productivity, richness, originality are crucial features of 
a good articulation (Rheinberger, 1997). ‘Boring’, ‘repetitive’, ‘redundant’, 
‘inelegant’, ‘simply accurate’, ‘sterile’, all are adjectives that designate a bad 
articulation. It is thus important to devise a touchstone that captures the most 
discriminative sharp-edged notion used by the scientists themselves, instead of 
using those that might impress the unwashed but that are never used by the white-
coats at the bench. The notion of articulation lends itself easily to this goal because 
of its linguistic meaning. To oppose inarticulate to articulate knowledge is, in 
effect, to oppose tautological to non-redundant expressions. Instead of saying « A 
is A », that is, repeat the same expression twice, an articulate scientific laboratory 
will say « A is B, is C, is D », engaging what a thing is in the fate or destiny of many other 
                                                
she has worked extensively with Ilya Prigogine and has developed a very original philosophy, first 
of physics, then of biology and what she calls ‘cosmopolitics’. She has recently written a 
masterpiece on A.N. Whitehead (2002). Vinciane Despret (Despret 1996; 1999; 2002), trained as a 
psychologist, professor of philosophy in Liege, also in Belgian, has put to good empirical use many 
of the insights of Stengers and has developed a marvelous series of studies on psychology and 
ethology.   
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things as well. This feature is in contradistinction with the correspondence theory of 
scientific truth which is condemned, at best, to tautology: it does nothing more, as 
we saw above, but repeat the original with as little deformation as possible (« A is 
A »). Such a defect, by itself, would be enough to discard the theory which has 
been maintained in place for no other reasons but political ones (Latour, 1999). 
Does the S-D’s shibboleth differ, on this point, from the Popperian criterion? Not 
much yet, since Popper too could say that propositions have to be interesting, i.e. 
that they should be able to put the theory at risk. To see the difference between 
the two touchstones, we have to turn to the third feature that defines the type of 
risk with which each criterion is concerned. 
 
3. Scientific means risky 
To be interesting (thus scientific, thus is in a position to hope for the possible 
but never guaranteed event of a good articulation) a laboratory has to put itself at 
risk. It does not simply mean, as in Popper or Lakatos, that it should look for those 
experimental instances that are most able to jeopardize the theory. This, 
according to S-D’s principles, is not risky enough —even if one could eliminate all the 
other difficulties pointed out by Kuhn and many psychologists about the utter 
implausibility of a falsificationist attitude among practicing scientists. The real risk 
to be run is to have the questions you were raising requalified by the entities put to 
the test. What is to be falsified is not just the empirical instance of the theory, but 
also the theory, the very research program of the imaginative scientist, the 
technical apparatus, the protocol. Instead of asking the comminatory question: 
“Do you answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ when I ask you a question?” (with falsification being 
only able to hope for a ‘no’ reply that starts again the search, while the ‘yes’ 
questions would prove nothing), the S-D’s criterion requires the scientist to say: 
“Am I asking you the right questions? Have I devised the laboratory setting that 
allows me to change as fast as possible the questions I ask depending on the 
resistance of your behaviour to my questioning? Have I become sensitive to the 
possibility of your reacting to artefacts instead of to my questions?” (Stengers, 
1997, 2000). Popper’s falsificationist principle abandons only the false dream of 
correspondence, but it maintains the scientist in command who still possesses the 
formidable privilege of raising the questions in his or her own terms, as in Kant’s 
schoolmaster fantasy. S-D’s principle requires the scientists to jeopardize also this 
privilege of being in command. The two quality checks are not the same: one may 
raise falsifiable questions and thus pass Popper’s exam, but fail pitifully when faced 
with S-D’s requests. 
 
4. Look for recalcitrance in humans and non-humans 
Phrasing the risk-taking of a good articulation in that way reveals the fourth 
originality of S-D’s touchstone: it tries to be applicable to both natural and social 
sciences at once. Not because it imagines a general purpose methodology —see 
item 1—, but precisely because it does not imagine a general methodology that 
would either dismiss the social sciences as hopelessly unscientific or submit them to 
the mere importation of the apparently more successful natural sciences. Social 
sciences may become as scientific —in S-D’s new sense—as the natural ones, on 
the condition that they run the same risk, which means rethinking their methods 
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and reshaping their settings from top to bottom at the occasion of what those they 
articulate say. S-D’s general principle becomes: devise your inquiries so that they 
maximize the recalcitrance of those you interrogate.  
Now, the truly revolutionary insight of S-D’s epistemology is to have shown 
that this motto is paradoxically harder to apply for humans than for nonhumans. 
Contrary to non-humans, humans have a great tendency, when faced with 
scientific authority, to abandon any recalcitrance and to behave like obedient 
objects offering to the investigators only redundant statements, thus comforting 
those same investigators in the belief that they have produced robust ‘scientific’ 
facts and imitated the great solidity of the natural sciences! The only true 
discovery of most psychology, sociology, economics, psychoanalysis, according to 
S and D, is that, when impressed by white coats, humans transmit objectivation 
obediently: they literally mimic objectivity, that is, they stop ‘objecting’ to enquiry, 
contrary to bona fide natural objects which, utterly uninterested by the inquiries, 
obstinately ‘object’ to being studied and explode with great equanimity the 
questions raised by the investigators —not to mention their laboratories!… This 
result, although totally counterintuitive (see for instance the opposite lesson drawn 
in Hacking, 1999), makes perfect good sense: social sciences have not been 
thwarted in their development by the resistance of humans to be treated as 
objects, but by their complacence about scientistic research programmes which 
makes it more difficult for the social scientists to quickly detect the artefacts of the 
design in the case of humans than in the case of nonhumans… Human science 
laboratories rarely explode! 
 
5. Provide occasions to differ  
The paradoxical consequence of S-D’s philosophy of science is that ‘scientific’ 
means rendering talkative what was until then mute. It is the best way, so far, to 
honour the word ‘logos’ that so many scientists have added to their discipline —or 
the even more suitable word ‘graphos’. If there is a physio-logy, a psycho-logy, a 
socio-logy, a glacio-logy, an ethno-graphy, a geo-graphy, etc., it is because there 
exist laboratory settings where propositions can be articulated in a non-redundant 
fashion. As the etymology of those disciplines nicely indicate, talking and writing is 
not a property of scientists uttering statements about mute entities of the world, 
but a property of the well articulated propositions themselves, of whole disciplines.  
This leads to the fifth feature of the S-D’s falsification principles which cuts 
savagely inside the sciences themselves —contrary to all the other epistemologies 
which rank entire disciplines through one single pecking order going usually from 
theoretical physics to pedagogy. Most protocols are said to be scientific because 
the scientists are as little engaged as possible in interacting with entities which are 
running with as little interference as possible from them. The popular ideal of 
science is thus made of a mute disinterested scientist letting totally mute and 
uninterfered entities run automatically through sequences of behaviour. But 
according to S & D, such a commonsense set up is a sure recipe for disaster [see 
Despret’s article]: a disinterested scientist abstaining from any interference with 
uninterested entities will produce totally uninteresting, that is, redundant 
articulations! The path to science requires, on the contrary, a passionately interested 
scientist who provides his or her object of study with as many occasions to show interest and to 
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counter his or her questioning through the use of its own categories. This is where the 
Stengers and Despret shibboleth differs radically from Popper’s falsification 
principles: most set ups that Popper would approve because they provide 
satisfactory instances of empirical falsification are taken as mere rubbish by S & D 
because they fail to satisfy these three minimal conditions of scientificity: Is the 
scientist interested? Are the elements under study interested? Are the articulations 
interesting? This does not save or damn entire disciplines but selects out specific 
results, articles, scientists, laboratories inside disciplines which, instead of being 
ordered through one single pecking order, end up forming a sort of archipelago of 
heterarchic connections, thus forcing scientists, philosophers and lay people to 
decide, case by case, if a given piece of science is valid or not (for a beautiful 
example of such an archipelago in the specific case of ethology, an intermediary 
case between natural and social sciences, see Strum and Fedigan, 2000; Despret 
2002). 
 
6. Neither distance nor empathy 
To realize the originality of S-D’s criterion we have to understand that it is 
not another plea for a more empathic or generous science that would overcome 
the cold and reductionist harsh necessity of objectivity —and even less a typically 
more ‘feminine’ contribution to a ‘male dominated’ epistemology. S-D’s criterion 
cuts and cuts as sharply as any male-devised shibboleth! What it does is immensely 
more productive than offering a plea for empathy, and this will be the sixth 
feature of their theory: it shows that neither distance nor empathy defines the well 
articulated science. You may fail to register the counter-questioning of those you 
interrogate, either because you are too distanced or because you are drowning 
them into your own empathy. Distance and empathy, to be useful, have to be 
subservient to this other touchstone: do they help maximize the occasion for the 
phenomenon at hand to raise its own questions against the original intentions of the investigator  
—including of course the generous ‘empathic’ intentions? It must be clear, 
according to this formulation, that abstaining from biases and prejudices is a very 
poor way of handling a protocol. To the contrary, one must have as many 
prejudices, biases as possible, to throw them at risk in the setting and provide 
occasions of manipulations for the entities to show their mettle. It is not the 
passion, nor the theories, nor the preconceptions that are in themselves bad, they 
only become so when they do not provide occasions for the phenomena to differ.  
This is where S & D make sense of most of science studies in offering a 
positive philosophy for the mass of mediations revealed by inquiries of scientific 
practice: the more mediations the better. This has nothing to do with the old Duhem-
Quine thesis of so-called ‘underdetermination’ —as if the task was still to 
distinguish between what the scientists say and what the world says, according to 
the zero-sum game metaphor criticized in the first section. On the contrary, the 
more scientists work, the more artificial set ups they devise, the more they 
intervene, the more passionate they are, and the more chance they offer for 
phenomena to become articulated through their ‘logos’ and ‘graphos’. This has 
nothing to do with an empathic version of science either, because when 
phenomena differ they also take their distance with the dramatically poor 
repertoire of sympathies and antipathies that the scientists possessed beforehand. 
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The misunderstanding comes from the meaning of ‘distance’. The distance to be 
researched is not that between the observer and the observed —this would be 
cheap exotism—, but that between the contents of the world before and after the 
enquiry. So neither distance nor empathy are sure guides that a good science has 
been concocted, but only this criterion: is there now a distance between the new 
repertoire of actions and the repertoire with which we started? If yes, then time 
has not been wasted; if no, then money has been spent in vain, no matter how 
‘scientific’, in the traditional sense, the results look like.  
 
7. Good and bad generalizations 
Scientific, in the hands of S & D, is an adjective that defines an articulation 
among propositions that allows them to be more articulate, that is, to generate less 
redundant ‘logies’ and ‘graphies’, thus modifying more and more the ingredients 
that makes up the multiverse, their repertoire of actions, their competencies and 
performances and, thus, the questions that they raise among those, scientists and 
non-scientists, who are put in touch with them. In this new definition, very little 
remains of the former “science is what provides an accurate picture of the world’’. 
Yet it retains most of the features recognized by the pioneering efforts of Popper 
and Lakatos to break away from the limits of the pictorial —and thus 
redundant— version of science: science is the creative and imaginative activity 
where the former versions of the multiverse are systematically jeopardized. For 
political reasons that do not need to be outlined here, Popper and Lakatos 
underestimated the extent to which scientific protocols had to be themselves 
recast. But one query needs to be answered: why is it better to go from less 
articulated to more articulated propositions? Is not the most traditional definition of 
science precisely the opposite: provide synthetic and coherent laws that sum up in 
the most economic ways widely dispersed phenomena in one single theory? 
Should not science travel from articulated propositions to fewer ones?  
This is the most interesting feature, the seventh in our list, of the S-D’s 
principle because it introduces a new wedge into two different versions of 
generalisations that were indistinguishable before. Provide as general an 
explanation as possible is one thing; eliminate alternative versions is another. The 
emphasis on going from less articulate to more articulate propositions allows S & 
D to sort out a good from a bad way of generalizing. The good ones are those who 
allow to connect widely different phenomena and thus to generate even more 
recognition of unexpected differences by engaging a few entities into the life and 
fate of many others. The bad ones are those who because they had had such a 
local success try to produce generality, not by connection of new differences, but by 
the discounting of all remaining differences as irrelevant.  
Genes, for instance, may be engaged in so many aspects of behaviour and 
development that they become obligatory ingredients that come to enrich any 
description of half a dozen sciences; or, in the hands of those who call themselves 
‘eliminationists’, they can be used to bulldoze their way through the same 
disciplines which are treated as archaic and obsolete because they raise non-
genetically framed questions. Instead of allowing the gene to modify many 
situations, and thus to be modified in its definition of what it does by those many 
encounters, eliminationists lose any chance to learn from experiment what a gene 
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is really doing (Kupiec and Sonigo, 2000). Wherever they go the gene will do the 
same thing, that is, literally, reproduce itself tautologically (see the critique of the 
discourse of gene action in Fox-Keller, 1999; Lewontin 2000))! Generalization 
should be a vehicle to travel through as many differences as possible —thus 
maximizing articulations— and not a way to decrease the number of alternative 
versions of the same phenomena. This feature is tied up to the first one above: the 
only reason why epistemologists had imagined an all-purpose methodology for 
producing scientific knowledge, is because of their eliminativism. Only by 
withdrawing from the multiverse most of the phenomena, can one imagine a 
general theory that succeeds every time it repeats the same argument and is never 
vehemently contradicted. The opposite of that position is not to abstain from any 
generalization, but, according to S-D, a generalization that runs the following 
additional risk: I accept to be at once general and compatible with alternative versions of the 
multiverse (Stengers, 1997; 1998). In the hands of Prigogine and Stengers, this has 
been a powerful way of sorting out branches and results of physics because of the 
problem of time: what can we make of a discipline, physics, which can only handle 
the ‘little detail’ of time by pretending it doesn’t exist (Prigogine and Stengers, 
1988)3? Popper would have left most of physics pass; not Prigogine and Stengers, 
because this kind of atemporal physics had paid its success by the obliteration of 
an obstinate feature: the irreversibility of time. For Stengers, the price was too 
heavy (Stengers , 2000). 
 
8. Allowing for a common world 
At this point, a reader might be worried that the S-D’s touchstone is no longer 
specific to science and objectivity. If it makes such a plea for more articulation, 
more risky descriptions, more compatibility, it could be applied to political order 
as well, especially because of this insistence on rendering talkative as many entities 
as possible and avoiding eliminativism. That’s precisely the crucial point of any 
political epistemology and the reason why the 4th feature —being applicable to the 
natural and social sciences— now becomes so essential.  
Let us not forget that any epistemology is a political epistemology: it is never a 
question of elaborating a theory of knowledge only, but always also a principle to 
map a divide between science and politics (Shapin and Schaffer, 1985; Latour, 
2004). Popper invented his whole machinery for no other purpose than being able 
to put Marxism and psychoanalysis out of the list of bona fide sciences and thus 
fight the enemies of the Open Society. Stengers and Despret are no exceptions to 
this venerable tradition except that their principle (and theirs only, so far) allows us 
not to prejudge the right way of discriminating within science and politics: between 
good and bad science and good and bad politics (not to say bad sciences allied to 
bad politics, good sciences added to good politics, bad sciences allied to good 
politics and good sciences allied to bad politics…). The great efficiency of S-D’s 
principle is to reopen this whole pandemonium that their colleagues tried to order 
                                                
3 The whole work of Ilya Prigogine —with and without Stengers— has been devoted to 
understand what changes physics should undergo when time —that is process— is reintroduced 
into it instead of being considered as a completely reversible dimension as it has been customary 
since at least Newton. 
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prematurely into one set of indisputable sciences and another sets of disputable 
false sciences mingled with disreputable politics. This eight feature of their theory 
is the most radical and the most immediately usable: (westernized and 
scientificized) humans have a tendency to obey scientific authority in a way that 
they would never do in any other more clearly political situation. This is what has 
led astray most scientists when they tried to apply the natural sciences to the social 
ones. What they saw as a miraculous extension of scientific objectivity was in effect 
the mere consequence of the aura of utter indisputability they had prematurely 
endowed the sciences with.  
Only in the name of science is Stanley Milgram’s experiment possible, to take 
one of S-D’s topoi. In any other situation, the students would have punched 
Milgram in the face… thus displaying a very sturdy and widely understood 
disobedience to authority4. That students obeyed Milgram’s torture does not prove 
they harbored some built-in tendency to violence, but demonstrates only the 
capacity of scientists to produce artefacts no other authority can manage to obtain, 
because they are undetectable. The proof of this is that Milgram died not realizing 
that his experiment had proven nothing about average American inner tendency 
to obey —except that they could give the appearance of obeying to white coats! 
Yes, artefacts can be obtained in the name of science, but this is not itself a 
scientific result, it is a consequence of the way science is handled (see the 
remarkable case of Glickman, 2000)). S-D’s principle, if taken seriously, means 
that the right cut is not the one that will distinguish science from politics but the 
one that will distinguish inarticulation (redundant science or redundant politics) 
from well articulated propositions. Whether you treat humans or non-humans, 
you should use the sets up that allow to maximize disputability.  
The problem with Popper and Lakatos’ shibboleth is that they were 
completely unable to do this since they tried to insulate indisputable science from 
the vagaries of politics. They could render some sciences indisputable but they 
were stuck whenever, to their great surprise and sometimes horror, discussions 
continued… Whereas for S & D the continuation of the discussions —that is the 
proliferation of other enduring versions of what the multiverse is made of, even 
after some sciences have spoken— simply means, to use my own terms at this 
point, that the task of composing the common world has not been prematurely 
simplified. We no longer wish to have scientists coming from hard sciences to 
define primary qualities —the essential ingredients that really make up the world, 
ingredients that are invisible to the common eyes and visible only to the scientists’ 
disembodied and disinterested gaze— while the common men and women are 
limited to secondary qualities that do not refer to what the world is like but only to 
their cultural and personal imaginations.  
                                                
4 Milgram’s experiment consisted, in the wake of the discovery of the horrors committed by the 
Nazis, in finding out whether or not obedience to authority could make average American behave 
in the same way as their German counterpart (Milgram, 1974). Subjects were instructed to inflict 
electric shocks to a dummy student to whom they were supposed to teach various things. To the 
great horror of Milgram, students did not stop inflicting extreme tortures in the name of pedagogy, 
invoking the orders they had received to justify their action. After several others, Stengers and 
Despret have revised this experiment in showing that it is the design itself which is horrific. 
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What the S-D’s principle invited us to do away with entirely is the notion of 
unknown factors that would make us act without us being aware of them. Not that S & D are 
against any explanation of a behaviour that is not conscious, but those 
explanations of invisible forces should be politely entered into the composition of 
the common world, that is, some chance should be left to those who are thus 
‘explained’ to discount them as irrelevant for reasons that have to do not only with 
their inner feelings or cultural imaginations —this is what Stengers called 
‘intolerant tolerance’ (Stengers, 1997)— but also with what the multiverse is really made 
up with. No common world may be achieved if what is common has already been 
decided, by the scientists, out of sight of those whose ‘commonalties’ are thus 
made up (Latour, 2004). Here again, the commonsense of S-D’s criterion cuts the 
pie differently from the Popper-Lakatos falsification principle that could accept 
politics to be dealing with values, only on the condition that the matters of fact be 
first safely removed from any political dabbling. Political epistemology always 
deals with the composition of the common world, and thus should be able to 
distinguish between good and bad articulations of science and politics, not only 
between good and bad sciences.   
 
This eight and last feature makes the S-D’s principle of sorting between bad 
and good science an extraordinary difficult, exacting and painful requirement 
because it forces scientists to take very seriously the outside of their science as well 
as the conditions at which their results can be made compatible or incompatible 
with the rest of the collective. Contrary to what the science warriors are sometimes 
imagining, the new attention to scientific practice has not slackened the constraints 
on scientific production —as if the slogan ‘anything goes’ had taken over the 
Academia—, but, at least in the hands of those two innovative philosophers, 
immensely increased the price at which good science can be purchased. The results of applying 
their shibboleth is something that every scientist and supporter of science 
suspected all along: good science is rare and when it occurs it is an event that 
should be cherished like a miracle, commented and disseminated like a work of 
art. 
Conclusion: How many bodies should we 
have? 
In what way does this passage through a new political epistemology help 
theorize the body differently? Like most questions raised under the modernist 
predicament, that of the body depends on the definition of what science is. This is 
especially salient in this case, since any ‘body talk’ seems to necessarily lead  to 
physiology and later to medicine. If science is left at its own device to define by 
itself and without further scrutiny or court of appeal what the body is made up of, 
as if it pertained to the realm of primary qualities, it will be impossible for other 
versions of what a body is to be sustained. Thus, it will be impossible for 
something like a democracy to be sustained when bio-power will have taken over, 
according to the dire prediction of Michel Foucault and his followers. One will be 
forced either into spirituality —the body is what is abandoned to ‘matter’ while 
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the essential aspects of the person are freed from its shackles— or into 
phenomenology —there is something into the lived-in embodiment that no cold 
and objective scientist will ever comprehend, and that should be saved against the 
arrogant pretensions of science. These two positions, however, abandon the fight 
too fast since they too quickly connect bodies, physiologies, materialities, medicine 
and primary qualities in one single package. If we modify the conception of 
science and takes seriously the articulating role of disciplines, it becomes 
impossible to believe in the dualism of a physiological body pitted against a 
phenomenological one. The great lesson of Stengers and Desprest, however, is 
that they do something science studies have carefully avoided doing: provide again 
a normative touchstone to distinguish good from bad science.   
One example will make this point clear. My former colleague in San Diego, 
the neurophilosopher Paul Churchland (Churchland, 1986), carries in his wallet a 
colour picture of his wife. Nothing surprising in it, except it is the colour scan of 
his wife’s brain! Not only that, but Paul insists adamantly that in a few years we 
will all be recognizing the inner shapes of the brain structure with a more loving 
gaze than noses, skins and eyes! Unquestionably, Paul sides with the eliminativists: 
once we have a way to grasp the primary qualities (in his case the brain macro 
structure, but it could be, for other even more advanced scientists, the micro 
structures of individual neurons, or the DNA sequences of the brain itself, or even 
further, the atomic structure of the biophysics of the DNA, or, as Hans Moravckek 
would have it, the information content of the whole body measured in gigabits!) 
we can eliminate as irrelevant all the other versions of what it is to be a body, that 
is, to be somebody. This example of Pat Churchland’s colour scan indicates why it 
would be silly to say that ‘in addition’ to the objective brain structure, there is also 
an old, maybe archaic, soon obsolete, subjective way to look at faces, the ordinary 
ones captured, for instance, on photographs. This would be granting the 
Churchlands the incredible privilege of defining brain scans as forming the 
indisputable primary qualities of the world —what the universe is made of— while 
letting humanists, lovers, archaic social scientists, add to this fabric of the universe 
the secondary subjective qualities, as little kits painting doodles on the washable 
walls of their kindergarten. Such a defeatist attitude would grant too much to the 
neurophilosophers and will miss all of the interesting features that will have been 
squeezed away by this body/soul dualism. It is at this point that I want science 
studies, supplemented by a hefty dose of normative epistemology, to add its grain 
of salt to the many disputes about primary qualities (see for instance, Varela and 
Shear, 1999). 
To begin with, there is nothing especially subjective about carrying the 
photography of one’s ‘significant other’ into one’s wallet. The whole history of 
photography is here to document how much our experiences have been shaped 
through the technical, commercial, aesthetic innovations of cameras (Jenkins, 
1979), exactly as much as noses have been trained by the ‘malettes à odeurs’ and 
other feats of the fragrance industry. We are thus not in a position to say that there 
are normal human beings who carry photographs of their lovers and mad 
scientists who try to reduce human subjectivity to mere neurons by carrying CAT-
scans around. The very idea of a ‘subjective side’ is a myth obtained by 
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discounting all the extrasomatic resources ever invented that allow us to be 
affected by others in different ways. The phenomenology of the lived-in body is 
every bit as dependant on material artifacts as is the neuroscientists laboratory at 
Salk Institute. But second, and more importantly, why not introduce Churchland’s 
enterprise as I treated the odour kits of the first section? I said above that, because 
of the training session, the trainee ‘learnt to have a nose’, to ‘be a nose’, by 
detecting small differences that were not affecting her before. Why don’t we use 
this formulation to account for Paul’s enterprise? He too is learning to become 
sensitive, through the mediation of instruments, to hitherto undetectable 
differences in the spin of the electrons of his cherished wife’s brain. Paul may be 
perfectly right in saying that we should all become sensitive to electrical differences 
in each other’s brains and that this sensitivity, this learning to be affected, will 
make us have a richer and more interesting understanding of others personality 
than mere boring facial expressions. With the odour kit we inhabit a richly 
odiferous word; with colour scans we inhabit a richly atomical electric world. 
Paul might be right, but he might be wrong, and this is where Stengers and 
Despret’s touchstone cuts, and cuts sharply. There is an immense difference 
between treating Churchland as the reductionist and eliminativist whom he claims 
to be, and treating his attempt as adding one more contrast, one more articulation 
to what it is to have a body. The first corresponds to the traditional vision of 
science: there are primary qualities; one can be reductionist; one level of a 
phenomenon can be used to provide a bedrock for, or alternatively, to eliminate 
another. The second corresponds to what can be called a science studies or a 
Jamesian or a Whiteheadian outlook: there is no primary quality, no scientist can 
be reductionist, disciplines can only add to the world and almost never subtract 
phenomena. In the traditional vision, Churchland is either right or wrong, that is, 
the layer of phenomena he is sticking to is wholly independent of his equipment, 
laboratory, disciplinary affiliations, ideologies. Primary qualities are detectable 
only by invisible and disembodied scientists reduced not even to brains, not even 
to atoms, but to pure thought.  
In a science studies version, however, what the neurophilosophers claim is up 
for grabs. They might articulate interesting contrasts, or they may repeat 
redundant results produced by other scientists that they don’t really comprehend 
because they have forgotten the narrow instrumental constraints to which a few 
isolated facts owe their existence —this is for instance what Edelman uncharitably 
claims (Edelman, 1994). Scientists might feel protected by Popper’s falsification 
principle as long as they crank out data in a reasonably scientific manner but there 
is no refuge against the Stengers'-Despret shibboleth. No amount of empirical 
falsification will render bad scientists immune against the accusation of having 
eliminated through their accounts most of the important contrasts they should 
have retained had they been ‘polite’ enough. If even hard physics can be 
castigated for having eliminated the ‘little detail’ of irreversible time, what 
treatment should be reserved to the much softer neurophilosophy which has 
obliterated what it is to make sense of an individual face or to detect a colour? 
This is the very paradoxical result of much science studies concerned with the 
body. It is not a fight against reductionism nor a plea for the whole personal, 
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subjective body that should be respected instead of being ‘cut into pieces’. It is, on 
the contrary, as this issue indicates so tellingly, a demonstration of how impossible 
it is for a reductionist scientist to be reductionist! In the laboratory of the most 
outrageously eliminativist white coats, phenomena proliferate: concepts, 
instruments, novelties, theories, grants, prices, rats, and other white coats… 
Reductionism is not a sin for which scientists should make amends, but a dream 
exactly as unreachable as to be alive and having no body. Even the hospital is not 
able to reduce the patient to a ‘mere object’, as it has been so beautifully 
documented by Annemarie Mol, Charis Thomson, Stefan Hirshauer, Marc Berg 
and many others (Cussins, 1998; Mol and Law, 1994; Berg and Mol, 1998). When 
you enter into contact with hospitals, your ‘rich subjective personality’ is not 
reduced to a mere pack of objective meat: on the contrary, you are now learning 
to be affected by masses of agencies hitherto unknown not only to you, but also to 
doctors, nurses, administration, biologists, researchers who add to your poor 
inarticulate body complete sets of new instruments —including maybe CAT-
scans. To the puzzle of the multiverse, is now added the puzzle of the folded body: 
how can you contain so much diversity, so many cells, so many microbes, so many 
organs, all folded in such a way that ‘the many act as one’, as Whitehead said? No 
subjectivity, no introspection, no native feeling can be any match for the fabulous 
proliferation of affects and effects that a body learns when being processed by a 
hospital (Pignarre, 1995). Far from being less, you become more. No scientist on 
earth can reduce this proliferation to just a few basic, elementary, general 
phenomena under his or her control. 
This is again where the Stengers-Despret normative argument is so 
important: to abandon the distinction between subjective and objective bodies, 
secondary and primary qualities, to deny to sciences the possibility of subtracting 
phenomena from the world, to revere hospital institutions that allow one to be 
affected, is not to abandon the difference between badly and well articulated 
propositions. On the contrary, it is to push the fight lines inside the sciences 
themselves as Donna Haraway has always advocated. We should not forget that 
what puts the question of the body on the forefront of social science is, on the one 
hand, the meeting of feminism, science studies and a fair amount of Foucault’s 
redescription of subjection, and on the other, the bio-industry expansion in all the 
details of our daily existence. This Body Politic, the fight around biopower —
certainly, as Foucault foresaw, the great question of this century—, cannot be 
sustained if one accepts to give science the imperial right of defining by itself the 
entire realm of primary qualities, while militancy would limit itself to the residual 
province of subjective feelings. Biopower should have a bio-counter power. 
Without it, ‘body talks’ will be never more efficacious than the songs of slaves 
longing for freedom. As this issue indicates so well, there is a life for the body after 
science studies and feminism, but it is not the same life as before. 
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